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Executive Summary 
 
This study provides the most comprehensive evaluation of the quality of recent 
economic analyses that agencies conduct before finalizing major regulations. We 
construct a new dataset that includes analyses of forty-eight major health, safety, and 
environmental regulations from mid-1996 to mid-1999. This dataset provides detailed 
information on a variety of issues, including an agency’s treatment of benefits, costs, net 
benefits, discounting, and uncertainty. 
We use this dataset to assess the quality of recent economic analyses and to 
determine the extent to which they are consistent with President Clinton’s Executive 
Order 12866 and the benefit-cost guidelines issued by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).  
We find that economic analyses prepared by regulatory agencies typically do not 
provide enough information to make decisions that will maximize the efficiency or 
effectiveness of a rule. Agencies quantified net benefits for only 29 percent of the rules. 
Agencies failed to discuss alternatives in 27 percent of the rules and quantified costs and 
benefits of alternatives in only 31 percent of the rules. Our findings strongly suggest that 
agencies generally failed to comply with the executive order and adhere to the OMB 
guidelines. We offer specific suggestions for improving the quality of analysis and the 
transparency of the regulatory process, including writing clear executive summaries, 
making analyses available on the Internet, providing more careful consideration of 
alternatives to a regulation, and estimating net benefits of a regulation when data on costs 
and benefits are provided. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Although regulations often have no direct fiscal impact, they
pose real costs to consumers as well as businesses. Regulations
aimed at protecting health, safety, and the environment alone
cost over two hundred billion dollars annually—about two-
thirds as much as outlays for federal, nondefense discretionary
programs.
1  Yet, the economic impacts of federal regulation
                                                                                                                           
* Mr. Hahn is director of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies. Mr. Burnett, Ms. Mader, and Ms. Moyle are researchers at the AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. Ms. Chan was a researcher at the
Joint Center when this work was undertaken.  The authors gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of Paul Tetlock, Tats Kanenari, and Amy Wendholt
and the comments of Randall Lutter.  The views expressed in this paper reflect
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with
which they are affiliated.
1. See KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH,  AND  SAFETY  REGULATION:  A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES  vii (1996);
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND  BENEFITS OF FEDERAL  REGULATIONS  4 (1999).
<http://www.whitehouse.gov./omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pdf>.  All
dollar figures are presented as constant 1999 dollars, adjusted by using the
consumer price index.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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receive much less scrutiny than the budget.
2
To encourage the development of more effective and efficient
regulations, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have
directed agencies to perform economic analyses of major
regulations that show whether a regulation’s benefits are likely
to exceed its costs and whether alternatives to that regulation
are more effective or less costly.  Each president also attempted
to increase agency accountability for decisions by requiring
that the President’s Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) review all major regulations.  More recently,
Congress embraced regulatory reform and inserted
accountability provisions
3 and analytical requirements into
laws such as the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1996, the Small Business Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996,
and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
4
The most prominent and far-reaching of these regulatory
reform efforts are President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291
and President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,286.  Both require
agencies to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) for
all major federal regulations.
5  Agencies have prepared RIAs
for almost twenty years in accordance with the executive
orders and guidelines for economic analysis provided by the
OMB.
6
                                                                                                                           
2. See J OINT  ECONOMIC  COMMITTEE  STUDY, TRENDS IN CONGRESSIONAL
APPROPRIATIONS:  FISCAL RESTRAINT IN THE 1990S 8 tbl.3 (1998).
3. Some examples of accountability mechanisms include regulatory oversight,
peer review, judicial review, sunset provisions, regulatory budgets, and
requirements to provide better information to Congress.
4. Analytical requirements include mandates to balance costs and benefits,
consider risk-risk tradeoffs, and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different
regulatory alternatives.  See  Robert W. Hahn, The Impact of Economics on
Environmental Policy, JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL  ECONOMICS AND
MANAGEMENT (forthcoming).
5. President Reagan coined the term regulatory impact analysis in Executive
Order 12,291, see 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981).  President Bush also used Executive Order
12,291. President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 changed the term regulatory
impact analysis to  assessment, see 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).  Executive Order 12,866
maintains most of Reagan’s requirements, but places greater emphasis on
distributional concerns.  Executive Order 12,866 also directs agencies to show that
the benefits of the regulation “justify” the costs, whereas Reagan’s Executive
Order required agencies to show that the benefits of the regulation “outweigh”
the costs.  See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981–1993); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993–2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
6. See Office of Management & Budget, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations
under Executive Order 12,866 (last modified Jan. 11, 1996)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html> [hereinafter OMB
Guidelines].HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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This Article suggests that the impact of RIAs has fallen short
of the expectations of regulatory reform advocates in part
because agencies do not fully comply with OMB’s guidelines.
7
The RIAs typically do not provide enough information to
enable regulatory agencies to make decisions that will
maximize the efficiency or effectiveness of a rule.
8
This conclusion is based on the results of an evaluation of
forty-eight major environmental, health, and safety regulations
and their associated RIAs.
9  The authors completed a
“regulatory scorecard” for each of the forty-eight regulations,
which includes a checklist of the requirements for a good
economic analysis outlined in the Executive Order and the
OMB guidelines.
10  The study of RIAs shows that agencies only
quantified net benefits—the dollar value of expected benefits
minus expected costs—for 29 percent of the forty-eight rules,
even though the Executive Order directs agencies to show that
the benefits of a regulation “justify” the costs.
11  The agencies
                                                                                                                           
7. Others have reviewed the quality of RIAs, but to our knowledge no one has
evaluated the impact on the regulatory process.  See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn,
Regulatory Reform:  What do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?, in R ISKS, COSTS,
AND  LIVES  SAVED:  GETTING  BETTER  RESULTS FROM REGULATION  208, 240–41
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); Richard D. Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic
Analysis:  Benefits, Costs, Implications, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA:  ASSESSING
REGULATORY  IMPACT 455, 463–74 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997); see also
KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH,
AND SAFETY REGULATION:  A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES vii (1996).
8. Economists frequently measure the “economic efficiency” of a policy in
terms of its impact on producers and consumers.  In theory, this is done by
estimating appropriate areas under demand and supply curves. There are
different measures used for effectiveness.  One measure is how closely a policy
achieves a goal.  Another measure economists frequently use is the average cost or
marginal costs of achieving a specific goal.
9. While the definition of major  has changed somewhat over times, it is
currently defined as a rule that is expected to “have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or
communities.”  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993–2000), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
10. The dataset includes regulations from April 1996 through July 1999.  A
complete list of the regulations is provided in Appendix 2.  Additional
information is available at the Joint Center website at
http://www.aei.brookings.org, including links to the full text of the rules, the
RIA when available, and the data used in this paper.  The Joint Center undertook
this study as the first phase of a project, termed the Joint Center Regulatory
Improvement Project, designed to enhance regulatory accountability and
transparency by making information about regulations more readily available on
the Internet.  This project will both provide information both on the quality of
recent RIAs and other regulatory analyses through summary information and
links to other on-line sources of regulatory information.
11.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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also did not adequately evaluate alternatives to the proposed
regulation, another element of the Executive Order.   Agencies
failed to discuss alternatives for 27 percent of the rules and
quantified the costs and benefits of alternatives for only 31
percent.  In addition, the agencies often failed to present the
results of their analysis clearly.  Agencies provided executive
summaries for only 56 percent of the rules.
This Article also offers specific suggestions for improving the
quality of RIAs, which will in turn improve the allocation of
regulatory resources.  These include: (1) the use of clear
executive summaries; (2) the provision of on-line RIAs; (3)
improved evaluation of regulatory alternatives; and (4)
improved assessment of net benefits.
Part II of the paper describes the methodology of the study.
Part III presents the results.  Part IV describes in detail the
policy recommendations to improve RIAs.
II.  METHODOLOGY
This study builds on previous efforts to evaluate the quality
of RIAs.
12  Whereas previous studies evaluated a few RIAs in
great detail, this study assesses the quality of forty-eight RIAs
published from April 1996 to July 1999.
13  This approach is
                                                                                                                           
12. For a review of several economic analyses, see ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA:
ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997); Arthur Fraas,
The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 113 (1991);  ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA’S USE OF BENEFIT-
COST  ANALYSIS  1981–1986 (1986); RESOURCES  COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
CAN  BE  USEFUL IN ASSESSING  ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATIONS, DESPITE
LIMITATIONS, (1984).  For a review of the regulatory oversight process, see KERRY
V. SMITH, ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S  EXECUTIVE  ORDER:  THE
RULE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (1984).
13. The authors obtained from OMB a list of all the rules that OMB reviewed in
the past four years.  From that list, they eliminated all transfer rules and rules
without an economic analysis.  They then selected the economically significant
rules that were finalized between the beginning of April 1996 and the end of July
1999.  The criteria used for including a rule in our database are similar to OMB’s
criteria for major “Environmental” and “Other Social” rules.  See O FFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, 10–11 (1999) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pdf>.  In several cases, an agency finalized an
economically significant rule but did not produce an economic analysis because
Congress prohibited funding the analysis.  See,  e.g., Appropriations 2000—
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies, Pub. L. No. 106-96 § 321, 113
Stat. 986, 1019 (1999) (preventing funds from being used to “prepare, promote or
promulgate any regulations . . . prescribing corporate fuel economy standards for
automobiles”).  See generally Average Fuel Economy Standards, 49 U.S.C. § 32,902
(1994). The authors excluded those rules from our database because no analysisHAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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advantageous because it is possible to identify common
strengths and weaknesses among many RIAs, a task that no
previous study has undertaken.
The authors included only major rules, also known as
“economically significant” rules, in the study because they
typically have annual costs or benefits in excess of one hundred
million dollars per year.  These rules have the largest impact on
society and agencies should scrutinize them more than other
rules.
14  Also, with a few exceptions, agencies produce RIAs for
all major rules.  The study excludes so-called “transfer” rules,
or rules designed to move resources from the federal
government to designated segments of the population, because
agencies generally do not assess the costs and benefits of
transfer rules.
15  The study only includes “non-transfer” rules,
which are rules that address market failures and focus on
achieving regulatory objectives, such as improving air quality.
The study further assumes that agency numbers presented in
RIAs are accurate and complete.  This approach allows third
parties to easily reproduce the study’s results. At the same
time, this approach precludes critical evaluation of the agency
estimates, which other authors suggest are often biased in
support of the regulation or are compromised by analytical
flaws.
16
The study examines the extent to which agency RIAs meet
the government’s own standards for economic analysis, as
described in the Executive Order and the OMB guidelines.
17
The Executive Order states, for example, that agencies shall
provide “an assessment, including the underlying analysis,” of
                                                                                                                           
was available.
14.  Presidents Reagan and Clinton recognized the importance of careful
analysis of economically significant rules when they issued Executive Orders
12,291 and 12,866, respectively.  See generally Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128
(1981-1993); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994).
15. According to OMB, a transfer occurs when wealth or income is redistributed
without any direct change in aggregate social welfare.  See Office of Management
& Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs  and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 65
Fed. Reg. 7198-01 (2000) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
3stevensdraft.pdf>.
16.  See, e.g., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS AT EPA:
ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).
17. Section 4(F)(7)(d) of  the Executive Order  requires the OMB to provide
agencies guidance in writing economic analyses.  See 3 C.F.R. 638, 643 (1993–2000),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).  The OMB convened an interagency group to
describe the best practices for preparing economic analyses. The results of that
effort were presented in a paper in January 1996. See OMB Guidelines, supra note 8.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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benefits and costs expected from a regulation and, “to the
extent feasible,” provide a quantification of those benefits and
costs.
18  The OMB Guidelines further direct agencies to express
benefits and costs in monetary terms “to the fullest extent
possible.”
19  The Executive Order also states that “agencies
should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.”
20
According to the Executive Order, the RIA must provide
sufficient information to demonstrate that the agency is
selecting the regulatory approach that maximizes net benefits,
unless the approach is prohibited by statute.
21  T h e  O M B
Guidelines further provide agencies with a recommended
approach for evaluating alternatives.
22
The authors developed a “regulatory scorecard,” based on
the Executive Order and the OMB Guidelines, summarized in
the Appendix.  Each item listed on the scorecard represents an
essential element of a good economic analysis.  The researcher
evaluating the RIA filled out the scorecard based on an
evaluation of the Federal Register notice, the agency’s formal
description of the rule that is available to the public, and the
RIA.
23  Another researcher then would validate the first
                                                                                                                           
18. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993).  It is arguably
not always possible or desirable to monetize all benefits and costs.  See Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39; OMB Guidelines, supra note 8.
19. OMB Guidelines, supra note 8. The OMB Guidelines discuss principles for
putting an explicit value on benefits that are difficult to monetize, such as
environmental amenities.  See also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, (1993);
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. II 1996) (requiring an
economic analysis that includes a quantification of impacts and consideration of
alternatives).
20. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39 (1993).
21. The Executive Order states that “agencies should select those approaches
that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety, and other advantages; distributional impacts; and equity),
unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.”  Id.
22. The OMB Guidelines urge agencies to define carefully the proper baseline,
discuss uncertainty and bias in estimates, and carefully describe key assumptions
used in developing estimates of benefits and costs.  See OMB Guidelines, supra note
8.
Although agencies may present reasons not to quantify and monetize benefits
and costs, and not consider alternatives for individual regulations, we believe
they should be able to meet the requirements of the Executive Order for a
majority of regulations. The authors recognize that quantification of costs and
benefits may prove difficult in some cases and that a qualitative measure may
prove valuable.  Some of those cases appear in the OMB Guidelines.  See id.
23. Whenever a discrepancy existed between the numbers presented in the
Federal Register and the RIA, the authors used the data that appeared in the Federal
Register because it is the official publication for agency documents.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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researcher’s findings by reviewing the same documents.  If the
findings of the two researchers differed for any part of the
scorecard, the researchers resolved the differences by
discussion.
Generally, there was little disagreement between researchers
because completing the scorecard did not require researchers to
subjectively assess the agency’s compliance with the Executive
Order and the OMB Guidelines.
24  Determining whether the
agency “discussed alternatives,” for example, is relatively easy
because an agency must simply mention the existence of
alternative regulatory approaches.
25  The most prominent
exception is the scorecard item that measures whether the
agency “considered the most important alternative
approaches” to the regulation.
26  Although this is an important
component of a good economic analysis, the authors did not




This Part describes the aggregate results of our study of
agencies’ economic analyses.  In general, we find that most
economic analyses do not meet the expectations set forth in the
Executive Order and the OMB Guidelines, and a significant
percentage clearly violate them.  Specifically, agencies
frequently do not provide the kind of information in the
analyses necessary to select the best regulatory alternative or to
show that the agency should proceed with the regulation.
This Part breaks the discussion of the results of the study into
the following categories:  estimation of costs, estimation of
benefits, comparison of benefits and costs, evaluation of
alternatives, clarity of presentation, and consistent use of
analytical assumptions. It then discusses conclusions arising
                                                                                                                           
24. Given the complexity of the RIAs, the researchers may have made some
errors when completing the scorecards. The authors welcome corrections. Please
submit any comments to us through our web site at
http://www.aei.brookings.org.
25. In EPA’s “Federal Test Procedure Revisions” rule, for example, the agency
did not discuss alternatives, except to claim the option selected “is the most cost-
effective alternative currently available” and to refer the reader to a discussion
elsewhere.  Motor Vehicles Emissions Federal Test Procedure Revisions, 61 Fed.
Reg. 54,851, 54,877 (1996).  This rule was scored as considering alternatives.
26. OMB Guidelines, supra note 8.
27. For more information regarding the definition of scorecard items, please
visit our on-line database at www.aei.brookings.org.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
No. 3]               Assessing Regulatory
Impact Analyses                   866
from the analysis.  Three agencies have finalized more than five
rules included in the database: the Department of
Transportation (“DOT”), the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), and the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”).  This study presents the results from these agencies
separately and grouped results from the remaining agencies
together, simply because no other single agency finalized
enough rules for meaningful summary statistics.
28
The reader needs to interpret the statistics presented in this
section with care.  Some agencies noted, for example, that
regulations have costs in addition to direct compliance costs
and administrative costs.  It would be misleading to suggest
that these agencies performed a lower quality analysis simply
because they noted the existence of some indirect costs of the
regulations, but did not attempt to quantify them.  In fact, the
acknowledgment of indirect costs is arguably an indication of a
more thorough analysis on the part of agencies.
A.  Estimation of Costs
Comprehensive estimates of regulatory costs allow decision
makers to compare regulatory alternatives and identify the
impact of a regulation on different groups to address
distributional concerns.  We found that agencies could present
the results of their cost analyses more clearly and identify the
impact on different groups more frequently, but in general,
agencies attempt to evaluate the costs of regulation.
Agencies always define categories of costs associated with a
proposed regulation and usually quantify some part of those
costs.  Approximately 95 percent of the economic analyses
quantified some costs, and 90 percent of economic analyses
monetized some costs.
29  Figure 1 shows that DOT, EPA, and
HHS monetized costs in over 80 percent of their respective
rules.
                                                                                                                           
28. The other agencies include the Department of Commerce (DOC), the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Labor (DOL), and the
Department of Agriculture (USDA).
29.  By “monetized” we mean that an agency put a dollar value on at least some
part of the relevant category, such as costs or benefits.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
No. 3]               Assessing Regulatory
Impact Analyses                   867





























Presented only a range of monetized costs
Presented only a best estimate of monetized costs
Presented both a range and a best estimate of monetized costs











a DOT—Department of Transportation. EPA—Environmental Protection
Agency. HHS—Health and Human Services. DOC—Department of
Commerce. DOE—Department of Energy. DOL—Department of Labor.
USDA—Department of Agriculture. The category “Other” includes DOC,
DOE, DOL, and USDA.
The other agencies monetized some costs for only about one-
half of the remaining rules.  Agencies monetized all stated costs
in only 63 percent of the rules.
Figure 1 also shows that agencies presented a “best estimate”
of monetized costs far more often than they presented an actual
range.  Over two-thirds of the regulations gave a best estimate
of costs, while only one-fourth presented a range of cost
estimates.  Only 13 percent of the regulations presented both a
best estimate and a range of costs.
An improved understanding of the impact of regulatory
costs on different groups allows policymakers to address
distributional concerns more effectively. The study considers
whether an economic analysis associated costs with the
following groups: producers, nonfederal governments, and theHAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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federal government.
30 Almost all economic analyses  (94
percent) note that a regulation will impose compliance costs on
producers.  A third of the analyses identify costs to nonfederal
governments, while about one-quarter of the regulations
identify federal budgetary costs.  Regulations impose costs on
these groups both directly and indirectly, and agencies
routinely identify and quantify some of these costs.  For
example, over two-thirds of the analyses note that the
regulation will have administrative costs.
31  In contrast, the
agencies rarely discuss and never quantify the macroeconomic
impacts of regulations in their economic analyses.
B.  Estimation of Benefits
Similar to cost estimates, benefit estimates allow decision
makers to compare regulatory alternatives and identify the
groups that benefit from a regulation.  We found that agencies
were less likely to quantify benefits than costs, and rarely
monetized benefits.  Moreover, agencies generally did not
present a range to represent uncertainties associated with
benefits.  Such evidence suggests that agencies can significantly
improve their analyses of regulatory benefits.
Almost all of the regulations (96 percent) identified
benefits.
32  The two rules that did not explicitly address benefits
were designed to reduce the costs of existing regulations.  Of
those rules that listed benefits, approximately 70 percent
described benefits in quantitative terms, either as a range or a
best estimate.  Only 17 percent of the rules presented both a
best estimate and a range of those quantitative benefits.
Figure 2 provides information on the extent to which
agencies monetized any benefits.  Agencies converted benefits
into dollar equivalents in less than one-half of regulations
examined.  Rarely did agencies give best estimates and ranges
                                                                                                                           
30.  Although these categories are useful, it is not a simple matter to estimate
the ultimate impact of costs on consumers and workers.  Indeed, the data
presented generally do not permit an assessment of the impact of regulations on
consumers, workers, and owners of capital.
31.  The Paperwork Reduction Act requires agencies to estimate the “paperwork
burden” imposed by regulations.  See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3504
(Supp. II 1996).
32.  In addition to benefits, agencies often include cost savings as a category of
regulatory impacts.  The difference between cost savings and benefits is more a
matter of semantics than economics, but we  separated cost savings and benefits if
the agency separated them.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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for monetized benefits.  DOT and EPA are the only agencies
that monetized benefits with at least 50 percent frequency.
DOT presented monetized benefits for two-thirds of their rules,
while HHS only monetized benefits in one-third of their
analyses.

























Presented only a range of monetized benefits
Presented only a best estimate of monetized benefits
Presented both a range and a best estimate of monetized benefits











a DOT—Department of Transportation. EPA—Environmental Protection
Agency. HHS—Health and Human Services. DOC—Department of
Commerce. DOE—Department of Energy. DOL—Department of Labor.
USDA—Department of Agriculture. The category “Other” includes DOC,
DOE, DOL, and USDA. In two rules the agencies do not expect any benefits.
These rules are excluded from this analysis.
Often agencies quantify and monetize only some of the
explicitly stated benefits.  Agencies quantified all of the stated
benefits for 54 percent of the rules and monetized all benefits in
only 28 percent of the rules.  Determining whether the benefits
that agencies chose not to quantify represent a significant
portion of the total benefits was beyond the scope of thisHAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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analysis, although it is an important issue.
Also, agencies monetized certain categories of benefits more
frequently than other categories.  For example, in 83 percent of
the rules for which agencies identified safety benefits, the
agency presented a monetized estimate of those benefits.  In
contrast, agencies monetized benefits for only 54 percent of the
rules that identified health benefits.  Perhaps most starkly, in
only 11 percent of rules for which agencies identify benefits
from pollution reductions did the agency actually monetize
those benefits.
33
C.  Comparing Costs and Benefits
A comparison of costs and benefits of a regulation helps
decision makers compare a specific regulation to other
proposed or existing regulations. Without such a comparison,
decision makers cannot know whether a regulation is the best
use of available resources. We found that agencies routinely
failed to compare their estimates of the costs and benefits,
using either net benefits estimates or cost-effectiveness
estimates.
Figure 3 reveals that only 28 percent of the rules present
information on net benefits, a key indicator of economic
efficiency.  Of those, about one-third presented best estimates,
while the other two-thirds presented a range.  Only two rules
presented both a range and best estimate of net benefits.
 34
                                                                                                                           
33.  Most of the monetized benefits from pollution reduction are due to lower
morbidity and mortality rates.  The study includes pollution reduction benefits as
a separate category because a substantial fraction of the rules in our database (44
percent) were expected to reduce pollution.
34.  See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States
in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
72, 75, 96); Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Final Rule
Regarding Energy Conservation Standards for Room Air Conditioners, 10 C.F.R. §
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Presented only a range of monetized net benefits
Presented only a best estimate of monetized net benefits
Presented both a range and a best estimate of monetized net benefits











a DOT—Department of Transportation. EPA—Environmental Protection
Agency. HHS—Health and Human Services. DOC—Department of
Commerce. DOE—Department of Energy. DOL—Department of Labor.
USDA—Department of Agriculture. The category “Other” includes DOC,
DOE, DOL, and USDA.
Of the three agencies that promulgated more than five rules,
HHS and EPA presented net benefits most often, while DOT
never presented net benefits.  Also, agencies tended to
monetize costs more frequently than benefits.
35  Agencies
monetized costs for 60 percent of the rules in the database,
monetized all benefits for 49 percent of the rules, and
monetized all costs and benefits for only 19 percent of rules.
Agencies failed to calculate net benefits for nearly half of the
regulations with monetized figures for unclear reasons.
Sometimes the agency provided enough information to
calculate net benefits but did not perform the calculation, even
though the calculation only requires the agency to subtract one
                                                                                                                           
35.  This finding is consistent with previous studies.  See generally H AHN,
ASSESSING THE GOVERNMENT’S NUMBERS, supra note 6.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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estimate from the other estimate.  One possibility is that
agencies do not feel that the cost or benefit estimates are
reasonable.
36  Thus, the difference between the two estimates
would not provide a meaningful estimate of net benefits.
Another possibility is that agencies are reluctant to present
net benefit estimates if those estimates are negative.  In the
database, of the thirty-one rules that provided estimates of
costs and benefits sufficient to calculate net benefits, only
one-half had benefits and costs savings that exceeded the costs.
The study further separates the thirty-one rules with benefit
and cost estimates into rules for which the agency presented
net benefits (twelve) and those where the agency did not
(nineteen).  In the first group, where the agency presented net
benefits, three-quarters pass a benefit-cost test.  In the second
group, only one-third pass the same benefit-cost test.  These
results lend some support to the view that agencies present net
benefits numbers more frequently when those numbers
support their regulation while agencies tend to omit net
benefits when the result would be negative.
Sometimes agencies present cost-effectiveness numbers,
either in addition to or instead of information on net benefits.
The agency calculated cost-effectiveness by dividing monetized
costs by some nonmonetary quantitative measure of benefits.
37
The cost-effectiveness calculation allows the agency to describe
the effectiveness of a regulation relative to alternative
regulatory approaches without assigning an actual monetary
value to quantified benefits.
Figure 4 shows that agencies presented an estimate of cost-
effectiveness for only one-third of the rules for which the
agency did not provide an estimate of net benefits.  Thus,
approximately half (48 percent) of the forty-eight rules
examined in this Article provided no direct measures of net
benefits or indirect measures based on cost-effectiveness.  Only
6 percent of the forty-eight rules provided both an estimate of
net benefits and an estimate of cost-effectiveness.
38  This
                                                                                                                           
36.  DOT does not present net benefits if it believes the benefit or cost numbers
are not sufficiently robust.  See Telephone Interview by Jason Burnett with the
general counsel’s office, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 20, 1999).
37. A cost-effectiveness measure works best when the rule has only one
expected benefit. If the agency expects multiple benefits, it is difficult to sum such
benefits to generate the denominator in the cost-effectiveness calculation.
38.   This estimate could be a best estimate, a range, or both.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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finding is important because cost-effectiveness calculations
may be particularly useful when benefits are difficult to
monetize or when agencies are simply reluctant to monetize
them.






























































Presented only a range of cost-effectiveness
Presented only a best estimate of cost-effectiveness
Presented both a range and a best estimate of cost-effectiveness











a DOT—Department of Transportation.  EPA—Environmental
Protection Agency.  HHS—Health and Human Services.  DOC—
Department of Commerce. DOE—Department of Energy.  DOL—
Department of Labor.  USDA—Department of Agriculture.  The category
“Other” includes DOC, DOE, DOL, and USDA.
Figure 4 also reveals the extent to which the cost-
effectiveness information varies by agency.  EPA presented
cost-effectiveness information for about half of the rules where
it did not present net benefit numbers.  DOT is the only other
agency that provided any information on cost-effectiveness for
rules in which net benefit information was not supplied.  ByHAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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presenting cost-effectiveness numbers, agencies avoided the
tasks of assigning a dollar value to estimates of pollution
abatement and of assigning a monetary value to extending a
human life.
Often, agencies do not present the results from cost-
effectiveness calculations in an appropriate manner.  For
regulations designed to reduce several types of pollution, EPA
often lumped all pollutants together in its calculation of cost-
effectiveness.
39   Depending on the composition of pollutants
reduced by the rule, that approach will either exaggerate or
understate the costs relative to a net benefit calculation.  On
other occasions, EPA calculated the cost-effectiveness of
reducing a single pollutant while ignoring the other benefits of
the regulation.
40  This approach overstates the true cost that
should be attributed to each ton abated.
D.  Discussion of Alternatives
The Executive Order and the OMB Guidelines direct
agencies to ensure that the regulatory alternative chosen
maximizes net benefits.
41  Unfortunately, the agencies generally
did not provide a significant analysis of alternatives in RIAs,
even when the agencies conducted a quantitative analysis of
their preferred option.
 42
Figure 5 shows the extent to which different agencies
analyzed alternatives.  Although agencies discussed
alternatives in over two-thirds of the rules examined, they
quantified the costs and benefits of alternatives in only a
quarter of these rules.  The three agencies with more than five
                                                                                                                           
39.  This aggregation may be more useful when using a weighted average.  For
example, DOT provides cost-effectiveness estimates for several of its regulations
after combining injuries and deaths by employing a weighting system.  See, e.g.,
Gas Pipeline Safety Standards, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,770 (1996).
40.  EPA did not include direct hydrocarbon and particulate matter reductions
in its calculation of cost-effectiveness of oxides of nitrogen emission reduction in
its rule governing locomotive emissions.  See Emission Standards for Locomotives
and Locomotive Engines, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,978 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
85, 89, 92).
41.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994); OMB Guidelines, supra note 11.
42.  For 35 percent of the rules, agencies presented estimates of benefits and
costs for the chosen alternative but failed to present such estimates for other
alternatives.  If agencies can quantify costs and benefits for the chosen alternative,
they likely should be able to quantify benefits and costs of relevant alternatives as
well.  So doing would presumably not require significant new information or
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rules in our database (DOT, EPA, and HHS) quantified benefits
and costs of alternatives in approximately 20 percent to 35
percent of their analyses.  No other agency quantified benefits
and costs of alternatives for any of its rules.  Only two rules out
of forty-eight calculated incremental net benefits of the
alternatives.
43  This incomplete consideration of alternatives
makes it difficult to assess whether alternatives would actually
be superior to an agency’s preferred policy, even using an
agency’s own assessment.





























Quantified costs and benefits of alternatives











a  DOT—Department of Transportation.  EPA—Environmental
Protection Agency.  HHS—Health and Human Services. DOC—
Department of Commerce.  DOE—Department of Energy.  DOL—
Department of Labor. USDA—Department of Agriculture.  The
category “Other” includes DOC, DOE, DOL, and USDA.
                                                                                                                           
43. Both are EPA rules.  See  Findings of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region
for Purposes of Reducing Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96); Regional Haze Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714
(1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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E.  Clarity of Presentation
RIAs are not transparent, in part because the results are not
reported clearly and consistently. Improving the clarity of
presentation in RIAs would help stakeholders understand the
impact of regulations. Agencies provided completely consistent
benefit numbers between the Federal Register and their RIA for
less than 60 percent of the rules.
44 Only about one-half of the
RIAs contained an executive summary. Only fourteen
regulations (29 percent) used an executive summary to present
tables of qualitative or quantitative estimates of benefits and
costs. Although many of the other RIAs contained such
information, it was not readily accessible.
45 RIAs often bury
specific economic information within a technical discussion of
the health or environmental impacts, making it difficult to find
a specific piece of information.
46 Although some criticize the
Federal Register notices for poor presentation of information, it
is easier to navigate and offers information in a more uniform,
accessible format than RIAs.
47
F.  Consistent Use of Analytical Assumptions
Agencies often failed to use consistent analytical
assumptions, the use of which would ensure that agencies are
comparing and presenting consistent results. Only ten out of
forty-eight rules used a consistent dollar year, a consistent
discount rate, and a consistent estimate of benefits and costs.
On a more positive note, almost three-fourths of the analyses
used a consistent discount rate for costs and benefits, a
generally accepted practice that permits the conversion of
future benefits and costs into an equivalent present dollar
value. Of the RIAs that  relied on a single discount rate, 86
percent used the rate of 7 percent specified in the OMB
                                                                                                                           
44. Although such inconsistencies may reflect new information used in the
analysis, the agencies made no attempt to explain them.
45. Several of the thirty-four regulations lacking data tables in the executive
summary did, nevertheless, present their results in an useful format, albeit less
accessible.
46. Often, rules describe basic economic concepts such as discounting and
nonmarket valuation.  Although such descriptions may be essential for an
understanding of the analysis, a lengthy discussion of techniques detracts from
and obscures the issues and assumptions that are unique to an individual
analysis.  Instead, the agencies should simply refer to OMB guidelines that
address those more general concerns.
47. See Hahn, Regulatory Accountability,  supra  note 6, at 16 (describing the
content and accessibility of information in the Federal Register).HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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guidelines, 14 percent used a discount rate less than 7 percent
and only one used a discount rate greater than 7 percent.
48
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The agencies’ economic analyses generally did not provide
adequate information about a proposed regulation to justify
decisions to proceed with the regulation.  The absence of
information on net benefits suggests strongly that agencies
largely have ignored the goal of the Executive Order and the
OMB Guidelines.  An agency’s RIA should be the starting point
for serious policy analysis rather than the end, and the agency
should provide the results in a consistent and transparent
manner.  Even if the agency complies with the Executive Order
and the OMB Guidelines, a deeper issue of assessing quality
remains to be addressed.
The study did not directly measure the quality of the
underlying analysis because it would have required knowledge
of specific technical issues.  Case studies by scholars suggest,
however, that many RIAs suffer from serious shortcomings.
49
A low score on the regulatory scorecard is, however, an
indicator of a potentially poor quality analysis, particularly if
the agency did not assess key economic variables, such as the
net benefits of a regulation.  In addition, a high score using our
criteria does not necessarily mean that the agency performed a
high quality analysis because the agency could mask analytical
flaws even if it complies with the Executive Order and the
OMB Guidelines.
An agency’s RIA could receive a low score for the following
three reasons: first, the agency may face resource constraints;
second, the agency does not want interested parties to know
that the benefits of the regulation may not justify the costs; and
third, the agency simply does not take the RIA requirement
                                                                                                                           
48. One HHS rule used a discount rate of 10 percent.  See  Medical Devices;
Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Final Rule; Quality System
Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,602, 52,646 (1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 808, 812,
and 820).
49. Scholars also point out that some economic analyses are of high analytical
quality.  See, e.g., Hahn, Regulatory Reform, supra note 4, at 240-41; Morgenstern &
Landy,  supra note 4, at 463-74; RANDALL  LUTTER, AN  ANALYSIS OF THE EPA’S
PROPOSED LEAD HAZARD STANDARDS FOR HOMES 3, 12-15 (AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 99-5, 1999) (discussing the
shortcomings of the EPA’s economic analysis of homeowner behavior, possible
premature housing abandonment, and discounting future benefits).HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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seriously because it is not enforced.  A complete discussion of
options for improving regulatory analysis and the regulatory
process is beyond the scope of this paper.
50 Nevertheless,
several recommendations flow naturally from our analysis.
These include:
requiring an agency to calculate net benefits when it can
estimate benefits and costs; and asking that agency to note
the limitations of those estimates;
requiring an agency to present both best estimates and
ranges for benefits, costs, and net benefits; or, alternatively,
asking an agency to justify why that cannot be done;
requiring an agency to quantify any benefits or costs that it
is unable or unwilling to monetize; or, alternatively, asking
that agency to justify why that cannot be done;
requiring an agency to expand its consideration of
alternatives;
requiring a clear executive summary along with a table that
summarizes what is known about the likely benefits and
costs of the regulation in a standard format;
requiring RIAs to have a consistent format so that it is easier
to obtain information from different RIAs and compare
them;
requiring that an RIA and supporting documents be posted
on the Internet so that such analyses are more easily
obtained by interested parties; and
requiring OMB to provide clearer guidance on how cost-
effectiveness numbers should be presented and calculated to
avoid some of the current problems.
Forcing agencies to adhere to such standards poses a critical
challenge.  President Clinton, working with OMB, apparently
has not been successful in implementing such reforms,
probably due to a lack of interest and willingness to spend
                                                                                                                           
50. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (proposing  methods of “simultaneously
promoting economic and democratic goals” through regulation); see generally
STEPHEN  G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS  CIRCLE: TOWARD  EFFECTIVE  RISK
REGULATION  ix  (1993) (providing political and institutional analysis of the
“problems with the present regulatory system”); ROGER G. NOLL, THE ECONOMICS
AND POLITICS OF THE SLOWDOWN IN REGULATORY REFORM (1999) (concluding that
economic analysis can be influential in promoting regulatory reform only when
such analysis is consensual, comprehensive, and objective).HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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political capital.
51  Such reforms likely may prove worthwhile,
not necessarily because the analysis itself will improve
dramatically, but rather because these reforms will enhance
transparency in the regulatory process.
Congress could pass a bill that incorporates these
suggestions.  It could also give OMB greater enforcement
authority and create an agency outside the executive branch to
report on how such guidelines are being implemented and to
review regulations.
52  T h i s  a n a l y s i s  r e c o g n i z e s  t h e  l a c k  o f
political enthusiasm for making the process more transparent.
At the same time, this issue could have some bipartisan appeal
because it arguably would hold regulators more accountable
for their policies, and more accountable to Congress.
Making the regulatory process more transparent will serve
two purposes.  First, it will give interested parties greater
access to a key part of the regulatory process used to support a
decision.  Second, it will increase the probability that scholars
will engage in independent regulatory analysis that could lead







Agency and Department:_______________  Date:________________
RIN#: __________________________ Status:  final interim-final page
Economically Significant: yes  no page   Transfer Rule:  yes no page
            
                                                                                                                           
51. Although the Clinton administration may deserve some blame, the problem
was also relevant in earlier Republican administrations. Previous studies would
suggest that economic analyses of regulations by agencies were not necessarily
better during the Bush and Reagan administrations. See HAHN, ASSESSING THE
GOVERNMENT’S NUMBERS, supra note 6, at 9; Morgenstern & Landy, supra note 4,
at 463-74.  Indeed, most presidents may be unwilling to spend the necessary
capital to improve the quality of analysis.
52. For example, Congress could say that OMB should not generally make a
decision on a proposed regulation unless the economic analysis satisfied certain
guidelines. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork
Reduction of the House Comm. on Small Business (2000)  (statement of Robert W.
Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Directors, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies) (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/
testimony/testimony_00_01.pdf>.HAHNGALLEYFINALX 11/1/00  5:15 PM
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   Score   Page     Notes
Identified Discount Rate
Used a Consistent Discount Rate
Identified Baseline for Costs
Identified Baseline for Benefits
Used Consistent Baseline for Costs and Benefits
Identified Dollar Year
Used Consistent Dollar Year
Performed Sensitivity Analysis
Gave Executive Summary
RIA is Available on the Internet
The RIA was Peer-Reviewed
Presented Best Estimate of Net Benefits
Presented Range of Net Benefits
Presented Best Estimate of Cost-Effectiveness
Presented Range of Cost-Effectiveness
Discussed Alternatives
Quantified Costs and Benefits of Alternatives
Quantified Incremental Net Benefits of Alternatives
Costs             Agency     Agency    Agency
                 States       Quanti-     Mone-
                  Exist          fied          tized
               S       P       S      P    S      P
Private Sector Producer Compliance Costs
Federal Budgetary Costs
Local and/or State Government Costs
Other Costs
Presented Range of Cost Estimates
Presented Best Estimate of Costs
Presented Consistent Cost Figures B/t RIA and
Federal Register
s = score; p = page
a For a complete copy of this scorecard, including the factors analyzed for
an agency’s treatment of cost savings, benefits, uncertainty and bias, see
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APPENDIX 2
LIST OF FINAL REGULATIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
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✣ ✣ ✣ ✣ For the full text of these rules, see <http://www.aei.brookings.org>.  The
rules can also be found at National Archives and Records Administration,
Federal Register Online via GPO Access (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html>.